In the first part of this series, I set out some understandings that I have about science framing as advocated by Nisbet and Mooney: First, that framing broadly understood is something we all do when we communicate on any issue, but that framing as it is associated with Nisbet and Mooney seems to me to be a set of disjointed, unsystematic techniques for communicating science, which avoids offending or alienating those who believe in antiscience. Their recommendations seem to be driven by several ideas:
- controversies about science are analogous to political campaigns;
- these campaigns need to be won;
- they are best won by appealing broadly to religious science deniers;
- through various specific techniques.
I said before that Nisbet and Mooney are wrong in several ways, and in part one I tackled how science controversies are not like political campaigns, informed by some of my own experience working in politics. In this part, I’m going to talk about the wisdom and effectiveness of appealing to science deniers.
Appealing to Science Deniers
If you want to win a public policy debate about sicence, like Nisbet and Mooney do, you need to get 51% of the vote. How best to do that?
Nisbet and Mooney say it is best done by avoiding alienating antisciencers. They want us to craft a message that is going to appeal to extremist religious people (evolution deniers, in other words) in order to depolarize the debate and unify the electorate so they - meaning religious antiscience extremists - can get behind our side of the issue. I’d call that a great idea, if it would work.
Will it work?
Nisbet and Mooney don’t know, and I will explain why they don’t know shortly. But for now, I’ll discuss this observation: political strategists often find it better, based on evidence, to polarize the debate.
We’ve all heard about - and Nisbet and Mooney occasionally cite - polling that describes the religious demographic in America. But this polling has not been designed to determine the implications for science-related policy debates. Nisbet and Mooney point to the polling and claim that the massive percentage of Americans who say they believe strongly in god means that we can’t afford to alienate them. But it could as easily be that we can’t afford not to alienate them if we want to win a policy debate.
Let’s explore this by looking at a somewhat different issue. Polling suggests that religious belief correlates with a desire to outlaw abortion and used armed government agents to prevent ladies from having them. But could it be that something else correlates even more strongly with taking a position on abortion?
Maybe. The correlation between religion and the ban-abortion movement is considerably less than 100%, with wide swaths of organized Christianity being pro-choice. At least on paper, this includes many mainstream protestant groups, such as the Episcopalians, the Methodists, and many others. Even within the more conservative Catholic church, healthy groups of organized dissenters promote the idea that, while abortion is bad, other consequences might well be worse, and that the use of government force to ban the procedure is a bad idea. So religious belief correlates only about 60% or so with a desire to use government force to stop abortion.
But I can easily imagine a stronger correlation between knowing what a blastocyst is, and wanting abortion to be legal.
If you were a political operative, working from limited resources to ensure reproductive rights, which would you rather do - craft a message that appealed to all religious people, or craft a message that resulted in more people knowing what a bastocyst is? There is no certainly correct answer in this particular case. We can reasonably assume that any message in favor of legal abortion, no matter how well crafted, will fail to appeal to most religious people who want to ban it. Therefore, it could be that crafting a message that will not appeal to these people, but which will appeal more strongly to potential swing voters, would be the better idea. We don’t know how to do that because we don’t have a good characterization of the populations at issue.
We also don’t have that kind of characterization in science controversies - and Nisbet and Mooney don’t either. Their recommendations are based on the flimsiest of evidence culled from studies of communication of unrelated issues. Nisbet and Mooney have done no research to determine whether their advice is really any good. Is there something that is a better correlate to science acceptance than religion? They have no idea. If there was such a thing, it might be better to craft messages to appeal to that thing - but nobody knows whether this is true.
So why should I take Nisbet and Mooney’s advice if they can provide no evidence showing whether it is good or not?
Moving on…. It is a routine goal of political operatives to “wedge” the groups they want to get votes from. The metaphor is that of driving a wedge into firewood to split it, and the creationists used this metaphor in the naming of their “wedge strategy” - a strategy that is hardly unique amongst public policy campaigns.
The technique begins by finding a population you’d like to get votes from - in Nisbet and Mooney’s case, it is religious people - and picking at disagreements within that community. Although we would think that people having something in common would hang together rather than separately, this is rarely the case. Amongst religious people, it is almost laughably easy to wedge Catholics against Baptists by exploiting their relatively small differences in order to overcome the solidarity otherwise enjoyed as a result of their massive agreements. And if you can appeal to a small percentage of a population, it can sometimes put you over the top in votes. Let’s say you are polling 48% today, having paid no special attention to the religious population Nisbet and Mooney want us to appeal to. If we could snag 10% of the votes from that population, what could we win by? Not unusually, in real political campaigns, the difference could result in six points, bringing a candidate to 54%, a strong win. In such cases, it is a no-brainer. You wedge that group, perhaps deliberately pissing off 90% of them in an attempt to get the ten percent you can appeal to. You do this because it is easier to accomplish than to successfully appeal to everyone in that population.
Should we do this in science debates? I have no idea from evidence. I have no polling that indicates who we might wedge or whether it would be effective. I only have anecdotal experience to guide my way. But my point is that Nisbet and Mooney are just as naive: they don’t offer up any such polling either. They act as though we have to appeal to, or at least avoid offending, all religious people, without having bothered to look at whether we really do. That may sound great if you are unaware of how common using a wedge is, but glossing over why you shouldn’t wedge the opposition doesn’t pass muster if you have real experience in the field of public policy communication.
Finally, Nisbet and Mooney are naive on one other point as well. It involves the “base.” The “base” are the people you can count on to vote for you, no matter what - if they vote. You have to keep them motivated enough to show up at the polls. If you alienate them, make them feel like second-class citizens by reaching out to people they don’t like and don’t understand, will you keep their support? They won’t vote for the alternative, but they might not vote at all, and that’s the problem. The example provided by thousands of political campaigns shows that alienating the base by trying to appeal too broadly is a real danger. Elections have been lost in this manner.
How is this an issue in the science debates? I can give at least one example. The state of Florida was recently subjected to an onslaught of creationist lobbying against good science standards for public schools, coordinated by out-of-state lobbyists and apparently paid for with out-of-state money. This was fought off by and large as a result of the work of Florida Citizens for Science. Now, if Dawkins and PZ Myers go quiet like Nisbet and Mooney childishly demand, what happens to the base? Will the activists working at these kind of tasks decide it just isn’t worth it if they lack air cover from such heavy hitters?
I’d be very worried about that, myself. I’d be worried enough that I’d be doing some polling to find out “what happens if” we make this broad appeal to religion and squelch Myers and Dawkins. Have Nisbet and Mooney done such polling?
No.
So why be so reckless? We don’t have good evidence about what to do here, but we can at least pay attention to what evidence there is, and that evidence suggests that Nisbet and Mooney propose something dangerous.
In the next (and I think final) installment, I will talk about specific tactics for use in this debate, and about the Overton window, and why Nisbet and Mooney’s ignoring that concept is dangerous.